

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Karen L. Blair

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Did Secretary Clinton lose to a 'basket of deplorables'? An examination of Islamophobia, homophobia, sexism and conservative ideology in the 2016 US presidential election

Karen L. Blair

Department of Psychology, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, NS, Canada

ABSTRACT

The current study compared attitudes towards LGBTQ individuals, racism, Islamophobia, ambivalent sexism and conservative ideology across Hillary Clinton voters, Donald Trump voters and third party/undecided voters in the 2016 US presidential election. Participants (n = 249) intending to vote for Clinton had significantly lower scores on all attitude measures compared to Trump and third party/undecided voters, with the exception of Islamophobia, where Clinton and third party/undecided voters had significantly lower scores than Trump voters. A multinomial logistic regression was run to assess age, education, attitudes towards LGBTQ individuals, Islamophobia, sexism and social dominance orientation, as predictors of being a Trump, Clinton or a third party/undecided voter. Attitudes towards LGBTQ individuals, Islamophobia, sexism and social dominance orientation were significant predictors of voting behaviour such that those who were less homophobic, less Islamophobic, less sexist and had less of a social dominance orientation were more likely to vote for Clinton than for Trump or a third party candidate. Ambivalent sexism was the strongest predictor of voting for someone other than Clinton, regardless of whether participants identified as Trump or third party/undecided voters. Results are discussed within the context of understanding the role of multiple prejudices in determining the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election.

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Election; sexual prejudice; ambivalent sexism; Islamophobia; Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump

Why did former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, lose the 2016 US presidential election to Donald J. Trump? By objective measures, many argued that she was one of the most well-qualified candidates to ever run for President in the country's history, and yet she lost to a person described as 'unfit' to hold the presidency, not only by his opponents in the Democratic party but by his own Republican counterparts (e.g. Caldwell, 2016). Some have suggested that the election of President Trump is evidence that established politicians, including Clinton, have lost touch with the populous and, by extension, lack an understanding of American attitudes and opinions concerning a variety of social issues. A number of these issues were brought to the forefront during the election by Trump's campaign, including how best to respond to threats of terrorism, how to secure the border from an influx of undocumented immigrants, worldviews on how society should be structured, the treatment of women and girls, ranging from issues of sexual assault to reproductive rights, and the 'appropriate' extension of civil rights to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) Americans. In addition to the issues directly discussed during the campaign, the 2016 presidential

CONTACT Karen L. Blair kblair@stfx.ca Department of Psychology, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, NS B2G 2W5, Canada

election in the United States marked the first time in its 239-year history that one of the major political parties had a female nominee, Hillary Clinton. Consequently, questions concerning the role of sexism in the election were also commonplace.

The current study examined how attitudes on some of these key election issues may have influenced voter intentions. It is important to note that in order to answer the question of why Clinton lost the election, it is not enough to ask why some voted for Trump while others voted for Clinton. It is equally important to examine those who were undecided or choosing to vote for a third party candidate. This is especially true for the 2016 election, given that only 53.7% of eligible voters cast a vote. Roughly 24.9% of the country voted for Trump, 26% voted for Clinton, 2.7% voted for a third party candidate and 46.3% of eligible voters did not cast a ballot. Although Clinton received more of the popular vote, she only received 232 Electoral College votes compared to Trump's 306, and the US presidential election is determined based on Electoral College votes and not the popular vote (CNN, 2016; Levine, 2016).

While the election was still ongoing, Clinton herself made a remark that pointed to the issue of attitudes differing significantly between Trump supporters and her own supporters. While giving a speech at the 'LGBT for Hillary Gala' on 9 September 2016, Clinton referred to 'half' of Donald Trump's supporters as a 'basket of deplorables' who espouse 'racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic [and] Islamophobic' sentiments (Holan, 2016). Although Clinton had prefaced her comments by saying that they were a gross overgeneralisation, there was a quick and immediate backlash to her choice of words, with the Trump campaign arguing that her comments indicated that she had 'contempt for everyday Americans' (Holan, 2016). On the day following her speech, Clinton apologised for estimating that *half* of Trump's supporters could be characterised by such terms, but at the same time, she doubled down on highlighting the aspects of the Trump campaign, which she deemed to be based on 'bigotry and racist rhetoric' (Holan, 2016).

On the day that Donald Trump announced his candidacy for the Republican Party Presidential nomination, he spoke of the need to secure America's borders and rid the country of illegal Mexican immigrants. He emphasised his point by referring to Mexican immigrants as rapists, criminals, and drug dealers (Trump, 2015). Although his announcement speech focused primarily on Mexican immigrants, later portions of his campaign demonstrated that his views extended to all illegal immigrants within the nation, albeit primarily those who are not White or not Christian (BBC News, 2017; Diamond, 2016; Pilkington, 2015). In addition to halting immigration reform, Trump's campaign included rhetoric about instating a ban on all Muslims entering the country, the use of 'extreme-vetting' of any individual emigrating from Islamic nations, and heightened scrutiny of Muslims already living in the United States (Blake, 2016). It should be noted that Trump made good on his word within the first 7 days of his presidency by signing an executive order banning citizens from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen from entering the United States for a period of 90 days. A federal judge in New York overruled the order, but Trump has continued to issue various versions of his 'travel ban' on a continuous basis throughout the first 8 months of his presidency (Almasy & Simon, 2017).

Trump's campaign also raised a number of questions concerning race. Trump declared that he was the 'best candidate' for Black American voters by stating that they had 'nothing to lose' in voting for him due to their current living conditions being marked by poverty and the threat of death on a daily basis (LoBianco & Killough, 2016). Despite this 'appeal' to Black voters, pre-election polls indicated that very few Black Americans (~1%) were considering a vote for Trump (Dann, 2016; LoBianco & Killough, 2016). With respect to sexual and gender diversity, Trump declared during his campaign that he was a strong supporter of the LGBTQ community following the 12 June 2016 shooting at Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida, and stated that anyone questioning his support of the community just needed to 'ask the gays' (Amatulli, 2016). This statement prompted a social media response with the hashtag #askthegays, enumerating the various ways in which the LGBTQ community did not support Trump (Amatulli, 2016; Sanders, 2016).

Consequently, much of the Clinton campaign strategy appeared to focus on bringing to the public's attention to various examples of how Trump, and his policies, exemplified a variety of prejudices. One tactic involved highlighting Trump's historical treatment of women in a variety of contexts. For example, in one incident, Trump disparaged a primary debate moderator,[1] Megyn Kelly, by indicating that she had 'blood coming out of her eyes' as she questioned Trump during the Republican primary debate and then followed up by stating that there was 'blood coming out of her – wherever' (Yan, 2015). Perhaps more telling was that Trump's dislike for Kelly was spurred by her questions to him concerning his past misogynistic and sexist comments in which he referred to women as 'fat pigs, dogs, slobs and disgusting animals' (Yan, 2015). While some may conclude from such remarks that Trump himself holds sexist and misogynistic views, this does not necessarily indicate that his supporters shared these views. It could be that Trump's sexist comments spoke to his supporters' own personal beliefs or that they simply did not see his past comments as sufficient reason to remove their support for his candidacy when they agreed with him on other policy issues.

Whether Trump had been the Republican candidate or not, issues of sexism were bound to be relevant to understanding the 2016 US presidential election merely due to the fact that Clinton was the first female candidate nominated by a major US political party. Consequently, it becomes important to evaluate the potential role that sexism may have played in determining voting intentions. The blogosphere[2] is rampant with articles arguing for and against evidence of sexism within the electoral population itself. Some vehemently argue that gender played no role in the election and that any dislike of Secretary Clinton was borne of legitimate reasons to dislike her political track record and the policies she would consequently support as president (e.g. Brooks, 2016; Rall, 2016). Others just as passionately argued that the single reason people were struggling with the notion of voting for Clinton was because they were uncomfortable voting for a female president (e.g. Price, 2016; Womack, 2016). Indeed, while researchers were unable to find a link between sexism and voting patterns in the 2008 election with respect to vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin, they did predict that sexism would have played a much stronger role had Clinton been the Democratic nominee in 2008, given the tendency for sexism to have more negative outcomes for women viewed as competent but lacking in warmth (Dwyer, Stevens, Sullivan, & Allen, 2009), as suggested by the Stereotype Content Model (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008).

In addition to questioning whether sexism was influencing voter intentions during the campaign, others raised questions of whether sexism was actually influencing the campaign itself in terms of how the two front-runner candidates were being treated. It was suggested that Clinton was subjected to a gendered double standard (Dittmar, 2016) or, in other words, was expected to adhere to a different set of rules and standards within the election as a function of her gender. In support of this claim, one can point to the considerable amount of media commentary addressing Clinton's voice, tone, stamina, fashion choices and facial expressions compared to a distinct lack of commentary on these issues concerning Trump (Dittmar, 2016; Parini, 2016). This pattern of holding female politicians to a different standard was also documented during the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries when a number of researchers identified evidence of sexist media coverage and treatment of female candidates, including Hillary Clinton (Carlin & Winfrey, 2009; Caroll, 2009; Uscinski & Goren, 2011).

Yet, beyond the 2008 primaries, very little empirical research to date has examined the role of sexism in the likelihood of voters supporting Clinton in the 2016 presidential election. One of the reasons that it can be so difficult to disentangle the contributions of sexism to voting preferences is the nature of sexism, and indeed, any prejudice. Consequently, examining indicators of ambivalent sexism may be particularly useful. Ambivalent sexism refers to the paradoxical ability of individuals to simultaneously hold benevolent and hostile views of women (Bush, 2016; Glick & Fiske, 1996). Women who adhere to traditional gender roles will often be viewed benevolently, or positively by such individuals, while women who break traditional gender roles in one way or another (such as by asking for political power) will often be subjected to hostility. With reference to the current

election, at least one study has identified hostile sexism as a predictor of supporting Trump. Wayne, Valentino and Oceno (2016) conducted a brief study in the midst of the 2016 election using a 4-item measure of hostile sexism. The more hostile an individual's views were towards women, the less likely they were to support Clinton and the more likely they were to support Trump. However, the study did not simultaneously assess benevolent sexism, leaving the question open as to whether the two different types of sexism may have been independently associated with voter intentions.

A 'basket of deplorables' or a cluster of prejudices?

When Clinton referred to half of Donald Trump's supporters as a 'basket of deplorables,' she implied that a driving force in people's decisions to back one candidate or another was tied to their general profile of holding one type of attitude over another. Her comments raise two important questions. To what extent did American voters vote based on a candidate's endorsement or rejection of specific prejudices, including racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia and Islamophobia? Furthermore, can such attitudes be lumped together within a single 'basket' of deplorable views towards various out-groups?

The current study sought to address both of these questions by examining how voter attitudes differed between three groups: Trump supporters, Clinton supporters and those who were undecided or considering a vote for a third party candidate. To the extent that voters can be segmented based on their social attitudes towards various out-group members, Clinton may very well have been accurate in linking a large number of prejudices together as a single construct. While 'a basket of deplorables' may not have been the most apt choice of words for a politician in her position, the phrase nonetheless captures the belief that one type of prejudice is likely to be associated with another.

From a social psychological point of view, in which researchers attempt to identify predictors of various prejudices and often attempt to create interventions to reduce specific prejudices, the idea that all prejudices may be held together by a common thread, in this case evidenced by a preference for a presidential candidate, suggests that there may be more prudent targets for intervention. The US presidential election serves as a useful microcosm to investigate these issues as it provides the opportunity to associate the attitudes of particular groups with specific behaviours, in this case, voting for one candidate or another. Furthermore, through assessing not only specific attitudes towards various out groups but by also examining individual difference factors, such as varying worldviews concerning the structuring of society, it becomes possible to see how such views are then associated with Clinton's suggested 'basket' of deplorable views towards out groups, and how this, in turn, may be related to the observable behaviour of voting intentions.

Social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism

In seeking to identify individual difference factors that might serve to bring together specific sets of prejudices within any given individual, two relevant contenders are authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (SDO), both of which are closely associated with one another (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Authoritarianism, which is often measured using the Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale (Altemeyer, 1981), is viewed as a personality or ideological dimension indicating the extent to which individuals believe authorities should be followed and dissenters should be punished (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). SDO, on the other hand, assesses the related notion of having a preference for hierarchically organised social structures, in which inequality between groups is seen as a natural and acceptable reality (Pratto et al., 1994). Past research has found that these two personality factors reliably predict a variety of other prejudicial and political attitudes (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Ekehammar et al., 2004 ; Whitley, 1999).

Within the context of the 2016 US presidential election, a handful of studies have attempted to link these constructs to the supporters of one candidate over another. Jonathan Weiler and Matthew MacWilliams (2016) used data from a national survey of 1800 voters in the United States to examine differences in authoritarianism between Clinton and Trump supporters. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they liked each candidate through the use of feeling thermometers, ranging from 0 to 100, where 0 represents a very cold feeling and 100 represents a very warm feeling towards the candidate. Participants' thermometer scores were then compared based on indicators of socio-economic status, including education and income, as well as their authoritarian views, assessed through four questions about parenting style. The results of the analysis indicated that regardless of socio-economic status, individuals scoring higher in authoritarianism viewed Trump significantly more favourably. The results were reversed for Clinton such that individuals with high levels of authoritarianism gave significantly lower ratings of warmth to Clinton (Weiler & MacWilliams, 2016).

To the extent that Weiler and MacWilliams' (2016) measure of authoritarianism was tapping into the same construct measured by the RWA scale, and to the extent that authoritarianism is associated with holding other prejudicial views towards multiple out groups, these results may provide indirect support for the notion that Trump supporters may have been more prejudiced than Clinton supporters. A more direct test of this supposition would require the administration of the actual measures of RWA and SDO, additional measures of prejudice, and an indication of voting intentions or behaviour within the presidential election.

While not specifically attempting to link multiple prejudices to an overarching individual difference factor, such as authoritarianism or SDO, other analyses of voter intentions in the 2016 US presidential election did examine how Trump and Clinton supporters differed on a variety of attitudes. Krouwel, Kutiyski and Beck (2016) used data from Election Compass USA 2016 to assess how supporters of Trump and Clinton differed in their views concerning how the nation should be governed. The authors noted that 'in every realm of governance, these two categories of voters have conflicting opinions' (Krouwel et al., 2016). For example, according to the data analysed, 52.6% of Trump supporters were opposed to the legalisation of same-sex marriage, compared to only 2.6% of Clinton supporters. Citizens were even more polarised on issues related to Muslims in the United States, with 75.3% of Trump supporters indicating that they agree, or completely agree, that 'Muslims should be subjected to stricter security checks at … airports and borders', compared to only 7.5% of Clinton supporters agreeing with the same statement.

Beyond the use of polling data, other attempts to assess American voter attitudes in the 2016 election were conducted using social media analyses. For example, two studies (Wang, Li, et al., 2016; Wang, Feng, et al., 2016) analysed Twitter accounts to see how various events in the campaign influenced followers. When Donald Trump claimed that Clinton's only leverage in the election was gained through playing the so-called woman card, women became more likely to begin following Clinton on Twitter and less likely to stop following her (Wang, Feng, et al., 2016). Although following social media patterns through the election can provide interesting insights, they are only ad-hoc measures of attitudes and intentions, at best, given that individuals may follow or unfollow various Twitter accounts out of curiosity, rather than as a reflection of how the account aligns with their own personal values or attitudes.

Current study

Although coverage of the election through the media and social media seems to make it clear that issues of prejudice were central to understanding the 2016 presidential election in the United States, there is very little academic research weighing in on the topic. The contributions that do exist often rely on polling data, which, although often based on a representative sample of voters, necessarily rely upon single item or insufficient measures to assess attitudes. Additionally, polls often measure attitudes at the same time as an indication of the respondent's voting preferences,

potentially leading to response bias issues, given that respondents are likely to understand that their attitudes are being linked to their voting preferences. The current study relies upon validated, multi-item attitude measures collected roughly 1–2.5 years before the presidential candidates received their party nominations and were not collected within the context of a political behaviour survey.

The current study investigated the following exploratory research questions, with no specific hypotheses being tested:

RQ1: Do supporters of the various presidential candidates differ on measures related to some of the key themes in the 2016 election, namely authoritarianism, sexism, Islamophobia, racism, and attitudes towards LGBTQ individuals?

RQ2: Which attitudes are the strongest predictors of participants' voting preference?

Method

Procedures and participants

Data for the current analysis were drawn from a larger study examining the link between attitudes and responses to images depicting same-sex affection, mixed-sex affection, neutral images and disgusting images (O'Handley, Blair & Hoskin, 2017). The original study was not designed to provide an assessment of voter attitudes, but given that the original survey, completed between April 2014 and February 2015, included a wide variety of attitude measures, the potential to link these attitudes to voting behaviour during the 2016 presidential election became evident during the final stages of the election. Participants were originally recruited to complete an online survey that was described as being about 'attitudes and opinions'. The description was purposefully vague, so as to not mark the study as being about any particular attitude or group of people (e.g. Islam, sexuality). All recruitment material directed participants to the study's website, which provided additional information about the study and a portal through which participants could begin the questionnaire. Participants were recruited from a variety of sources, including targeted Facebook ads directed predominantly at men living in Utah between the ages of 18 and 45, as this was the sample of interest for the original study given that the second phase of the original study required participants to physically visit the research lab, located in Salt Lake City, Utah.

In late 2014, the survey portion of the study was opened to a broader population and Facebook ads began targeting men and women living in the United States between the ages of 18 and 45. Participants were also recruited through word of mouth, on-campus flyers, and mailings sent to homes within 30 mi of Salt Lake City, Utah. The majority of participants (82.1%) reported finding the study through Facebook. Participants were informed that some individuals completing the online survey would be invited to participate in a paid in-lab study at a later date.

In the fall of 2016, shortly after the first US presidential debate, participants were invited to complete a brief follow-up questionnaire concerning their voting intentions for the 2016 US presidential election. It is important to note that this was not a planned follow-up survey. Of the original 886 who completed the online attitudes survey, 270 eligible voters responded to the follow-up questionnaire about voting intentions (30.5% response rate; an additional 28 responded but were not eligible to vote in the USA). Those who responded to the survey about voting preferences tended to be older (M = 34, SD = 13.38 vs. M = 27, SD = 6.01) and had slightly lower scores on each of the variables of interest in the current analysis, with the exception of SDO, in which there was no difference, and Islamophobia, in which those who responded had slightly higher scores.[3] Respondents did not differ from non-respondents in terms of education and, proportionately, women were more likely to respond than men. Of these, 21 were missing data

on more than 2 measures used in the current analysis. After determining that there were no demographic differences between those with complete versus missing data, the 21 cases were cut from the data set, resulting in a final sample size of 249 eligible voters.

To control for potential haphazard answering patterns, SurveyGizmo provides 'data quality' indicators, including response time per question and potentially suspicious answering patterns. All participants in the current sample had response times between greater than 45 min (mean completion time was 90 min), with the exception of one participant (34 min). This participant's answers were flagged for potential 'straight-line' response patterns, but upon further inspection of this individual's data, it was not deemed to be haphazard in nature and so was kept within the data set.

Because the original larger study was targeting the attitudes of men, the majority of participants in the sample are male (95.2%). Additionally, because the optional in-lab portion of the study was to take place at The University of Utah, located in Salt Lake City, just over half of the participants in the sample are from the state of Utah (60.6%). Table 1 presents the demographics for the full sample. Participants had an average age of 29.1 and had received an average of 16.4 years of education (where 12 years represents the completion of high school). The majority of participants identified as White (85.1%), Mormon (57.1%) and heterosexual (81.8%).

Measures

Participants completed 22 different validated measures in addition to providing demographic information. The measures used in the current analysis are described below and specific information about their psychometric properties can be found in the citations provided for each. For each measure, with the exception of those used to assess demographics and voting intention, a mean score was calculated, with higher scores indicating more of the construct in question. The means, standard deviations, possible ranges and indicators of reliability (Cronbach's alpha) with 95% confidence intervals are available in Table 2.

Demographic questions

Participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, number of years spent in formal education (beginning with elementary school), highest level of education completed, geographic location, ethnicity (Asian, Black, White, Hispanic, Native American, other/mixed), religion, religiosity and sexual identity (straight, gay/lesbian, bisexual, asexual, other).

Attitudes towards the LGBTQ community

Attitudes towards members of the LGBTQ community were assessed using three scales: the *Modern Homonegativity Scale* (MHS; Morrison, Kenny, & Harrington, 2005; Morrison & Morrison, 2002), a 10-item scale[4] with a 5-point response scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5); *Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gay Men* (ATLGM; Herek, 1988), a 10-item measure of 'old-fashioned' homophobia with a 5-point response scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5); the *Genderism and Transphobia Scale* (GTS; Hill & Willoughby, 2005), a 32-item measure with a 7-point response scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7); and the *Attitudes Towards Transgendered Individuals Scale* (ATTIS; Walch, Ngamake, Francisco, Stittl, & Shingler, 2012), a 20-item measure with a 7-point response scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). For the MHS and ATLGM, the gay-male versions were used.

Racism and Islamophobia

Racism and Islamophobia were measured using two separate scales: the *Modern Racism Scale* (McConahay, 1986), a 7-item measure using a 5-point response scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5); and *The Islamophobia Scale* (Lee., Gibbons, Thompson, &

Table 1. Sample demographics split by candidate.

	Full sample		Trump		Clinton		Third party and undecided		Group differences		
	n = 249		*n* = 29		*n* = 96		*n* = 124		One-way ANOVA		Chi-square
	N (%)	*M* (SD)	*N* (%)	*M* (SD)	*N* (%)	*M* (SD)	*N* (%)	*M* (SD)	*F* (or Welch's *F*)	*Post-hoc*	
Age											
Range: 18–73		29.12 (8.59)		32.31 (11.59)		30.11 (10.23)		27.6 (5.66)	Welch's $F(2, 66.44) = 4.160$, p .020	ns	
Number of years of education											
Range: 6–27		16.40 (2.73)		16.17 (3.16)		17.09 (2.7)		15.92 (2.52)	$F(2, 36.58) = 5.095$, p .007	C > TU, p .005	
Gender											
Man	237 (95.2)		29 (100)		86 (89.6)		122 (98.4)				$\chi^2(2) = 10.805$, $p < .01$[c], Cramer's $V = .21$, $p < .01$
Woman	12 (4.8)		0		10 (10.4)		2 (1.6)				
State											
Utah	151 (60.6)		16 (55.2)		58 (60.4)		77 (62.1)				$\chi^2(8) = 3.55$, p .86
Other red state	28 (11.2)		3 (10.3)		11 (11.5)		14 (11.3)				
Blue state	47 (18.9)		6 (20.7)		18 (18.8)		23 (18.5)				
Swing state	20 (8.0)		4 (13.8)		9 (9.4)		7 (5.6)				
Outside USA	1 (.4)		0		0		1 (.8)				
Ethnicity											
White	212 (85.1)		26 (89.7)		83 (86.5)		103 (83.1)				$\chi^2(2) = 1.021$, p .60[a]
Not-White	37 (14.9)		3 (10.3)		13 (13.5)		21 (16.9)				
Sexual identity											
Heterosexual	202 (81.8)		23 (79.3)		68 (70.8)		111 (89.5)				$\chi^2(2) = 12.668$, $p < .005$[a], Cramer's $V = .23$, $p < .005$
Gay/Lesbian	26 (10.5)		3 (10.3)		18 (18.8)		5 (4)				
Bisexual	13 (5.3)		3 (10.3)		5 (5.2)		5 (4)				
Other	8 (2.4)		0		5 (5.2)		3 (2.4)				

(*Continued*)

Table 1. (Continued).

	Full sample		Trump		Clinton		Third party and undecided		Group differences		
	n = 249		*n* = 29		*n* = 96		*n* = 124		One-way ANOVA		Chi-square
	N (%)	*M* (SD)	*N* (%)	*M* (SD)	*N* (%)	*M* (SD)	*N* (%)	*M* (SD)	*F* (or Welch's *F*)	*Post-hoc*	
Religion											
Mormon	141 (57.1)		21 (72.4)		26 (27.1)		94 (75.8)				$\chi^2(2) = 55.630$, $p < .001$[b], Cramer's $V = .47$, $p < .001$
Other Christian	10 (4)		3 (10.3)		2 (2.1)		5 (4.0)				
Atheist/Agnostic	42 (16.8)		1 (3.4)		33 (34.4)		8 (6.4)				
Spiritual, not religious	33 (13.3)		3 (10.3)		22 (22.9)		8 (6.5)				
Others (incl. Islam, Judaism, Buddhism)	23 (8.8)		1 (3.4)		11 (11.4)		9 (7.3)				
Third party candidate choice											
Jill Stein	6 (2.4)						6 (4.8)				
Gary Johnson	61 (24.5)						61 (49.2)				
Evan McMullen	8 (3.2)						8 (6.5)				
Undecided	38 (15.3)						38 (30.6)				
Other	11 (4.4)						11 (8.9)				

[a]Analysis comparing two categories: heterosexual or not.
[b]Analysis comparing two categories: Mormon or not.
[c]Two cells had expected cell counts <5.

Table 2. Scales, sample items, possible ranges and Cronbach alphas.

Scale	Example item	Possible range	Alpha
Modern Homonegativity	Gay men should stop shoving their lifestyle down people's throats	1–5	.94 (.92–.95)
Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gays	I think male homosexuals are disgusting	1–5	.95 (.94–.96)
Genderism Transphobia	Men who act like women should be ashamed of themselves	1–7	.94 (.90–.93)
Attitudes Towards Transgender Individuals	Transgenderism is immoral	1–7	.97 (.96–.98)
Modern Racism	Blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted	1–5	.87 (.85–.90)
Islamophobia	Islam is a dangerous religion	1–5	.96 (.95–.97)
ASI: Ambivalent		1–5	.91 (.89–.92)
Hostile Sexism	Women seek to gain power by gaining control over men	1–5	.92 (.89–.93)
Benevolent Sexism	Many women possess a quality of purity that few men possess	1–5	.88 (.84–.89)
Right Wing Authoritarianism	What our country really needs, instead of more 'civil rights' is a good stiff dose of Law and Order	−4 to +4	.97 (.96–.98)
Social Dominance Orientation	Inferior groups should stay in their place	1–7	.90 (.86–.90)
Religious Orientation	I often have a strong sense of God's presence	1–7	.86 (.84–.89)
Protestant Work Ethic	A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character	1–7	.83 (.78–.85)
Likelihood of Voting	How likely are you to vote in the upcoming US presidential election?	1–10	

Timani, 2009), a 16-item measure with a 5-point response scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).

Ambivalent sexism inventory

The ambivalent sexism inventory (ASI) consists of 22-items measured using a 6-point response scale ranging from (1) disagree strongly to (5) agree strongly (Glick & Fiske, 1996). The overall scale assesses ambivalent sexism, which represents a combination of the two subscales that independently assess hostile and benevolent sexism. In the current analysis, the overall score for ambivalent sexism as well as the two subscales were used in separate prediction analyses. Group differences are reported for the sub-scales.

Conservative ideology

Conservative beliefs were assessed using four scales: the *RWA Scale* (Altemeyer, 1981), a 30-item scale rated with a 9-point response scale, ranging from −4 (strongly disagree) to +4 (strongly agree); The *SDO Scale* (Pratto et al., 1994), a 16-item measure using a 7-point scale to assess participants' positive and negative feelings towards each statement, ranging from very negative (1) to very positive (7); The *Protestant Work Ethic Scale* (Mirels & Garrett, 1971), a 19-item measure assessing beliefs concerning the duty of individuals to achieve success through hard work and cautious spending, using a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7); and The *Religious Orientation Scale – Revised* (Trimble, 1997), a 14-item scale using a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) to assess individual religiousness.

Voting intentions

In the 2016 follow-up survey, participants were asked to indicate whether they were eligible to vote in the 2016 US presidential election. Participants who indicated that they were eligible to vote were asked who they were planning to vote for at this point in the election and were provided with the following response options: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Jill Stein, Gary Johnson, Darren Castle, other (write in) or undecided. These participants were then asked to indicate how likely they were to vote on election day, using a 10-point scale ranging from not at all likely to definitely going to vote. Participants who indicated that they were not eligible to vote in the upcoming election were asked to indicate who they would vote for if they were eligible to vote, using the same response options provided to eligible

voters. These participants were not asked about their likelihood of voting given their ineligibility.

Results

Voting responses and likelihood of voting

The largest number of participants indicated an intention to vote for Hillary Clinton (38.6%), followed by Gary Johnson (24.5%), undecided (15.3%) and Donald Trump (11.6%). Many participants also indicated that they would be voting for an alternative candidate (10.0%), including Jill Stein, Evan McMullen and a number of 'write in' options, such as Bernie Sanders. The breakdown of voting intentions by demographic variables can be seen in Table 1. Participants indicated high intentions of voting, with a mean score of 9.1 (SD = 1.79), where 10 indicated absolute conviction that they would vote in the election.

Attitude differences by candidate choice

Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, test statistics, p values and effect sizes (η^2) for a series of one-way ANOVA analyses comparing attitudes across three categories of participants: Clinton voters, Trump voters and individuals planning to vote for a third party/write-in candidate or who were still undecided. Prior to grouping participants by these three categories, participants within the latter category were compared based on their original voting answers: Johnson, other candidates and undecided. The three groups only differed significantly from one another on one variable, religious orientation (Welch's F (2, 59.24) = 4.651, p = .013) such that individuals voting for Johnson had a lower score on the Religious Orientation Scale (M = 4.18, SD = 1.16) compared to undecided voters (M = 4.73, SD = .72; p = .012). Participants indicating some other candidate did not differ in anyway from the other two groups. Consequently, these three groups were combined into a single category, 'third party or undecided' for the remainder of analyses. Where Levene's test for homogeneity was violated, Welch's ANOVAs were run instead and are reported in Table 3. Mean differences and 95% confidence intervals for significant *post-hoc* comparisons are reported in Table 4. The overall pattern of results for each analysis is discussed below, grouped by overall constructs. Figure 1 presents a visual comparison of attitudes and voting intentions by group, using group means of standardised values for each measure.

Attitudes towards the LGBTQ community

One-way ANOVAs were used to compare the three categories of voters on four measures of attitudes towards the LGBTQ community: Modern Homonegativity (MHS), Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gays (ATLG), Attitudes Towards Transgender Individuals (ATTIS) and Genderism and Transphobia (GTS). All four analyses were statistically significant and, in each case, *post-hoc* comparisons revealed that those intending to vote for Clinton scored significantly lower than third party and undecided voters as well as individuals planning to vote for Trump.

Racism and Islamophobia

Groups differed significantly in levels of racism, with Clinton voters reporting the lowest levels of racism, followed by undecided or third party voters, and Trump voters reporting the highest levels of racism. The *post-hoc* analysis revealed significant differences between voters for Clinton and the other two categories at the $p < .001$ level of significance, while the difference between Trump voters and undecided or third party voters was significant at the $p < .05$ level. With respect to Islamophobia, Trump voters reported significantly higher levels than both Clinton voters and third party and undecided voters, with Clinton and the undecided or third party voters not differing significantly from each another.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics and group comparisons on attitude measures by candidate.

	Overall	Clinton	Trump	Third party and undecided	One-way ANOVAs		
Scale	*M* (SD) *n* = 249	*M* (SD) *n* = 96	*M* (SD) *n* = 29	*M* (SD) *n* = 124	*F*(df), *p* Welch's *F*(df), *p*	ω^2	*Post-hoc* tests
Modern Homonegativity	2.80 (1.05)	1.99 (.78)	3.43 (.93)	3.26 (.85)	$F(2, 245) = 71.918$, $p < .001$	.36	C < T and TU
Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gays	2.35 (1.16)	1.54 (.73)	3.00 (1.24)	2.82 (1.06)	W's $F(2, 72.74) = 63.854$, $p < .001$	.30	C < T and TU
Genderism Transphobia	2.53 (.90)	1.93 (.60)	3.13 (.97)	2.85 (.81)	W's $F(2, 73.00) = 56.388$, $p < .001$	.29	C < T and TU
Attitudes Towards Transgender Individuals	2.24 (.89)	1.66 (.65)	2.70 (.93)	2.57 (.82)	$F(2, 241) = 60.918$, $p < .001$	.25	C < T and TU
Modern Racism	2.13 (.78)	1.58 (.53)	2.78 (.76)	2.41 (.68)	$F(2, 241) = 60.918$, $p < .001$	.33	C < T and TU TU < T*
Islamophobia	1.64 (.81)	1.44 (.69)	2.52 (1.06)	1.58 (.69)	W's $F(2, 1.28) = 13.249$, $p < .001$	.16	C and TU < T
ASI: Ambivalent	2.21 (.84)	1.55 (.70)	2.76 (.71)	2.59 (.62)	$F(2, 242) = 76.488$, $p < .001$	.38	C < T and TU
Hostile Sexism	2.01 (1.00)	1.34 (.89)	2.63 (.86)	2.37 (.82)	$F(2, 242) = 47.340$, $p < .001$	.27	C < T and TU
Benevolent Sexism	2.42 (1.00)	1.76 (.85)	2.89 (1.02)	2.81 (.83)	$F(2, 246) = 43.946$, $p < .001$	.26	C < T and TU
Right Wing Authoritarianism	−.98 (1.70)	−2.25 (1.11)	.12 (1.55)	−.25 (1.49)	W's $F(2, 75.30) = 76.944$, $p < .001$	.35	C < T and TU
Social Dominance Orientation	2.62 (.94)	2.07 (.73)	3.24 (.85)	2.89 (.89)	$F(2, 246) = 35.738$, $p < .001$	.21	C < T and TU
Religious Orientation	3.98 (1.19)	3.34 (1.07)	4.46 (1.14)	4.37 (1.08)	$F(2, 246) = 27.796$, $p < .001$	.17	C < T and TU
Protestant Work Ethic	4.57 (.74)	4.18 (.64)	4.88 (.89)	4.81 (.64)	$F(2, 245) = 26.429$, $p < .001$	.17	C < T and TU
Likelihood of Voting	9.07 (1.75)	9.61 (1.00)	9.10 (1.68)	8.63 (2.10)	W's $F(2, 72.93) = 10.306$, $p < .001$	.06	TU < C

$p < .001$ unless otherwise noted; *$p < .05$; Welch's *F* denoted by W's *F*; ω^2 for Welch's *F* calculated using standard ANOVA output. Tukey and Games–Howell (for Welch's) *post-hoc* comparisons. C: Clinton; T: Trump; TU: third party and undecided.

Table 4. *Post-hoc* comparison mean differences, 95% confidence intervals and correlation matrix.

			95% CIs		Correlation matrix													
Scale	Comparing	Mean difference	Lower bound	Upper bound	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
MHS	C – TU	−1.27	−1.54	−1.00	1													
	C – T	−1.44	−1.85	−1.02														
ATLG	C – TU	−1.28	−1.57	−1.00	.80	1												
	C – T	−1.46	−1.57	−.87	**													
GTS	C – TU	−.92	−1.15	−.70	.77	.82	1											
	C – T	−1.21	−1.68	−.74	**	**												
ATTIS	C – TU	−.91	−1.15	−.66	.80	.88	.87	1										
	C – T	−1.03	−1.42	−.65	**	**	**											
MRS	C – TU	−.83	−1.04	−.62	.68	.57	.63	.60	1									
	C – T	−1.20	−1.52	−.88	**	**	**	**										
	TU – T	−.37	−.68	−.06														
Islamophobia	C – T	−1.08	−1.45	−.71	.37	.29	.39	.36	.37	1								
	TU – T	−.94	−1.30	−.58	**	**	**	**	**									
Ambivalent Sexism	C – TU	−1.04	−1.25	−.82	.79	.71	.74	.70	.68	.32	1							
	C – T	−1.21	−1.25	−.88	**	**	**	**	**	**								
Hostile	C – TU	−1.03	−1.31	−.75	.70	.47	.57	.54	.64	.38	.84	1						
	C – T	−1.29	−1.72	−.86	**	**	**	**	**	**	**							
Benevolent	C – TU	−1.04	−1.32	−.77	.64	.72	.67	.64	.50	.16	.84	.41	1					
	C – T	−1.13	−1.32	−.70	**	**	**	**	**	*	**	**						
RWAS	C – TU	−2.00	−2.41	−1.58	.78	.85	.79	.81	.62	.27	.75	.53	.74	1				
	C – T	−2.37	−3.13	−1.62	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**					
SDOS	C – TU	−.82	−1.08	−.55	.58	.39	.49	.49	.54	.42	.52	.55	.32	.49	1			
	C – T	−1.17	−1.58	−.76	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**				
PWES	C – TU	−.62	−.84	−.41	.51	.41	.40	.36	.43	.17	.61	.46	.56	.51	.30	1		
	C – T	−.70	−.66	.47	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**			
ROS	C – TU	−1.03	−1.38	−.68	.53	.72	.62	.64	.41	.07	.50	.23	.60	.70	.17	.29	1	
	C – T	−1.12	−1.67	−.58	**	**	**	**	**	ns	**	**	**	**	**	**		
Likelihood of Voting	TU – C	−.98	−1.49	−.46	−.15	−.13	−.14	−.13	−.19	.00	−.18	−.14	−.16	−.18	−.19	−.13	−.03	1
	TU – T	−.47	−1.36	.41	*	*	*	ns	**	ns	**	*	*	**	**	*	ns	

C: Clinton, TU: third party or undecided, T: Trump. $^{**}p < .001$; $^{*}p < .05$; ns = $p > .05$.

MHS: Modern Homonegativity Scale; ATLG: Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gays; GTS: Genderism & Transphobia Scale; ATTIS: Attitudes Towards Transgender Individuals Scale; MRS: Modern Racism Scale; RWAS: Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale; SDOS: Social Dominance Orientation Scale; PWES: Protestant Work Ethic Scale; ROS: Religious Orientation Scale.



Figure 1. Attitudes and voting intentions compared by group using group means of standardised values for each measure.

Ambivalent sexism inventory

Groups were compared on the overall score from the ASI as well as the two subscales for the measure: hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. On all three indicators, Clinton voters reported significantly lower levels of sexism than both Trump and undecided or third party voters, who did not differ significantly from each other.

Conservative ideology

Indicators of conservative ideology included right-wing authoritarianism (RWAS), protestant work ethic (PWES), social dominance orientation (SDOS) and religious orientation. On all four measures, Clinton voters reported significantly lower levels than both Trump and undecided or third party voters, who did not differ significantly from each other.

Voting intentions

Groups also differed significantly in their intentions to vote, with undecided and third party voters reporting the lowest intention of voting in the 2016 US presidential election. Although this group reported a significantly lower intention than individuals planning to vote for Clinton or Trump, the mean score in this group was still well above the mid-point of the scale.

Prediction of candidate choice

A multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted to assess whether old-fashioned homophobia (ATLG), Islamophobia, ambivalent sexism and SDO had a significant effect on the odds of observing each voting choice, Trump or third party/undecided, relative to Secretary Clinton. Education and age were entered as control variables. The predictors were selected based on the common themes of the US 2016 presidential election: Islam (Islamophobia Scale), LGBTQ rights (ATLG), the first female presidential candidate (ambivalent sexism) and political ideologies extending to one's worldview (SDO scale).[5]

Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were assessed to ensure an absence of multicollinearity in the model. All of the predictors in the model had VIFs less than 10, indicating that the assumption of no multicollinearity was met.

Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression table with voting intentions predicted by age, years of education, attitudes towards lesbians and gays, Islamophobia, ambivalent sexism and social dominance orientation.

							95% CI for OR	
Variable	Voting intention	*B*	SE	χ^2	*p*	OR	Lower bound	Upper bound
Intercept	Third party/Undecided	−1.67	1.48	1.27	.261			
Age	Third party/Undecided	−.03	.03	.95	.331	.97	.92	1.03
Years of Education	Third party/Undecided	−.20	.08	5.65	**.017**	.82	.70	.97
ATLG	Third party/Undecided	.89	.27	11.23	**<.001**	2.44	1.45	4.12
Islamophobia	Third party/Undecided	−.13	.34	.16	.688	.87	.45	1.69
Ambivalent sexism	Third party/Undecided	1.20	.38	10.08	**.002**	3.33	1.58	6.99
Social dominance orientation	Third party/Undecided	.73	.25	8.58	**.003**	2.08	1.28	3.41
Intercept	Trump	−6.95	2.19	10.03	.002			
Age	Trump	.02	.03	.29	.590	1.02	.95	1.09
Years of education	Trump	−.18	.11	2.89	.089	.84	.68	1.03
ATLG	Trump	.82	.34	5.78	**.016**	2.28	1.16	4.45
Islamophobia	Trump	.93	.38	6.06	**.014**	2.54	1.21	5.33
Ambivalent sexism	Trump	1.17	.55	4.55	**.033**	3.22	1.10	9.41
Social dominance orientation	Trump	.86	.35	5.98	**.014**	2.37	1.19	4.73

$\chi^2(12) = 164.88$; $p < .001$; McFadden $R^2 = .36$. Voting intentions relative to Clinton. Bolded values highlight significant *p* values.

The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5 and were significant, $\chi^2(12) = 164.88$, $p < .001$, suggesting that the predictor variables had a significant effect on the odds of observing voting intentions for either Trump or third party/undecided relative to voting intentions for Clinton. McFadden's R^2 was .36, indicating that the model had excellent fit (Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000). Given the significance of the overall model, each predictor was examined further.

Age and education

The regression coefficient for age was not significant in predicting voting for a third party or being undecided relative to voting for Clinton, nor was it significant in predicting voting for Trump, relative to Clinton. The regression coefficient for the number of years spent in formal education was a significant predictor of voting third party or being undecided, relative to voting for Clinton (i.e., more educated individuals were less likely to vote third party or to be undecided). The number of years an individual had spent engaged in formal education was not a significant predictor of intending to vote for Trump, relative to Clinton.

Attitudes towards lesbians and gays (ATLG)

The regression coefficient for old-fashioned homophobia for voting for a third party or being undecided was significant such that those with more negative ATLGs were more likely to be a third party or undecided voter. The regression coefficient for old-fashioned homophobia was also significant when examining votes for Trump versus Secretary Clinton, such that those with more negative views of lesbians and gays were more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton.

Islamophobia

The regression coefficient for Islamophobia in predicting votes for Third Party candidates or being undecided relative to voting for Secretary Clinton was not significant. However, Islamophobia was a significant predictor of voting for Trump, relative to Clinton, such that those with higher levels of Islamophobia were more likely to vote for Trump.

Table 6. Multinomial logistic regression table with voting intentions predicted by age, years of education, attitudes towards lesbians and gays, Islamophobia, hostile sexism, benevolent sexism and social dominance orientation.

							95% CI for OR	
Variable	Voting intention	*B*	SE	χ^2	*p*	OR	Lower bound	Upper bound
Intercept	Third party/Undecided	−1.60	1.50	1.14	.286			
Age	Third party/Undecided	−.03	.03	.93	.335	.97	.92	1.03
Years of education	Third party/Undecided	−.20	.08	5.66	**.017**	.82	.70	.97
ATLG	Third party/Undecided	.93	.29	10.12	**.001**	2.53	1.43	4.47
Islamophobia	Third party/Undecided	−.15	.34	.19	.661	.86	.45	1.67
Hostile sexism	Third party/Undecided	.65	.24	7.55	**.006**	1.91	1.20	3.02
Benevolent sexism	Third party/Undecided	.53	.30	3.05	.081	1.69	.94	3.06
Social dominance orientation	Third party/Undecided	.72	.26	7.90	**.005**	2.05	1.24	3.39
Intercept	Trump	−7.01	2.21	10.09	.001			
Age	Trump	.02	.03	.23	.628	1.02	.95	1.09
Years of education	Trump	−.18	.11	2.90	.089	.84	.68	1.03
ATLG	Trump	.77	.37	4.32	**.038**	2.16	1.05	4.48
Islamophobia	Trump	.97	.39	6.39	**.011**	2.65	1.25	5.64
Hostile sexism	Trump	.47	.36	1.64	.200	1.59	.78	3.26
Benevolent sexism	Trump	.71	.41	2.96	.086	2.04	.91	4.59
Social dominance orientation	Trump	.90	.36	6.22	**.013**	2.46	1.21	4.99

$\chi^2(14) = 165.49$; $p < .001$; McFadden $R^2 = .36$.

Ambivalent sexism

The regression coefficient for ambivalent sexism in predicting votes for a third party candidate or being undecided, relative to voting for Secretary Clinton, was significant, with those who were higher in ambivalent sexism being more likely to be a third party or undecided voter. The regression coefficient for ambivalent sexism in predicting votes for Trump relative to Clinton was also significant, with those higher on ambivalent sexism being more likely to vote for Trump.

Social dominance orientation

The regression coefficient for SDO in predicting votes for a third party candidate or being undecided, relative to voting for Clinton, was significant. Individuals higher on social dominance were more likely to be a third party or undecided voter. SDO was also a significant predictor of voting for Trump, relative to Clinton, such that those higher in social dominance were more likely to vote for Trump.

Revised model

Although the model described above fit the data well, a revised model was run in order to assess which of the sub-scales of the Ambivalent Sexism Scale were associated with voting intentions. Table 6 presents the results of the multinomial logistic regression with age, years of education, ATLG, Islamophobia, hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, and SDO entered as predictor variables. The results of this second multinomial logistic regression model were significant, $\chi^2(14) = 165.49$, $p < .001$, McFadden $R^2 = .36$. The general pattern of results in this second model was similar to the first model with respect to significant predictors of voting intentions, as can be seen in Table 6. Breaking ambivalent sexism into its two subscales, hostile and benevolent, did, however, result in some changes to the model.

The regression coefficient for hostile sexism was a significant predictor of voting for a third party candidate or being undecided, relative to intending to vote for Clinton, such that those with higher levels of hostile sexism were more likely to be a third party or undecided voter, relative to those voting for Clinton. Hostile sexism was not a significant predictor of voting for Trump relative to Clinton. The regression coefficients for benevolent sexism were not significant in terms of predicting third party/undecided or Trump votes, relative to Clinton, although the significance level for both may be considered within the 'trending' range, with *p* values of .081 and .086, respectively.

Discussion

The current study examined group differences on a wide array of attitudes as a function of voting intentions in the 2016 US presidential election. A clear pattern of results emerged which clearly contrasted the attitudes of Clinton voters, Trump voters and third party/undecided voters. On the vast majority of measures, Clinton voters were significantly different from both Trump and third party/undecided voters, with the exception of only two measures: Islamophobia and voting intentions. On all other measures, Clinton voters were clearly distinguishable from both Trump and third party/undecided voters, with the latter two groups not significantly differing from each other.

Clinton voters in the current sample reported more positive attitudes towards a cross-section of groups within society, including gay men, transgender and gender diverse individuals, women and ethnic minorities. Clinton voters also showed significantly lower levels of Islamophobia than Trump voters but were not significantly different on this measure compared to third party/undecided voters.

In addition to holding different views about people, Clinton voters were also distinguishable from Trump and third party/undecided voters by their views about how the world and society should function. Specifically, Clinton voters had significantly lower levels of authoritarianism and were less likely to subscribe to a hierarchically ordered sense of society (SDO). Finally, Clinton voters also placed less of an emphasis on religion in their lives than did voters for Trump and third party/undecided voters. In all cases, the observed effect sizes for group comparisons were quite large, with all but one being greater than .14, the often-used cut-off point for designating an effect size as large. The single effect size below this threshold was for intentions to vote, which had a medium effect size of .06.

Although Trump and third party/undecided voters could not be distinguished from each other on the vast majority of measures, they did significantly differ from each other on two variables: Islamophobia and intentions to vote. With respect to Islamophobia, Trump supporters were set apart from both Clinton voters and third party/undecided voters. Indeed, Trump's views towards Muslims may have been one of the strongest deterrents to voting for Trump for many of the third party/undecided voters, whose views on Islamophobia appear closer to those of Clinton's supporters than Trump's supporters. Islamophobia was the single attitude measure where Clinton and third party/undecided voters did not demonstrate a significant group difference from each other. Additionally, Islamophobia was a significant predictor of voting for Trump over Clinton, with a single point increase on the Islamophobia scale representing a sizeable increase in the likelihood of voting for Trump. Conversely, Islamophobia was not a significant predictor of being a third party/undecided voter, relative to voting for Clinton, once again suggesting a greater level of agreement between Clinton and third party/undecided voters concerning issues related to Muslim travel bans or the treatment of non-Christian religions.

Beyond Islamophobia, ATLGs (or old-fashioned homophobia), SDO and ambivalent sexism were all strong predictors of being a Trump or third party/undecided voter in the current sample. For each scale-point increase in old-fashioned homophobia, participants were substantially more likely to be a third party or undecided voter, rather than voting for Clinton, and similar results were found when comparing the likelihood of voting for Trump versus Clinton. The likelihood of being a third party, undecided or Trump voter also increased as a function of SDO, such that those higher in social dominance were less likely to vote for Clinton, although it was a stronger predictor of Trump votes than third party or undecided votes. The strongest predictor of not voting for Clinton, however, was ambivalent sexism.

For every single point increase on the ASI, participants were three times more likely to be a third party/undecided voter and three times more likely to be voting for Trump rather than Clinton. Furthermore, it was ambivalent sexism specifically that held such strong predictive power within the models, as when the subscales that make up ambivalent sexism, hostile and benevolent sexism, were entered individually, their predictive power was weakened. Specifically,

while hostile sexism remained a significant predictor of being a Trump or third party/undecided voter, benevolent sexism was not significant in either model. What is curious, however, is that hostile sexism was not a stronger predictor of voting intentions than ambivalent sexism. If ambivalent sexism were merely a 'sum of its parts' representing hostile and benevolent sexism, one would expect ambivalent sexism to be a somewhat weaker predictor of voting intentions if hostile sexism were the true underlying motivator of voting intentions. On the contrary, however, it appears that the particular nature of being ambivalent, such that one is able to simultaneously hold positive views of some women while endorsing hostile views of other women, is an important distinction to make in understanding how voters responded to a female presidential candidate. Future research should explore this distinction further in understanding the associations between sexism and voting behaviour. Furthermore, when the two subscales were separated, hostile sexism was only a significant predictor of being a third party or undecided voter, not a Trump voter. This may point to the role that hostile sexism played specifically among those who did not vote for either of the main party nominees and who possibly did not vote at all.

A basket of deplorables

Do the current data provide evidence for Clinton's characterisation of Trump supporters as representing a 'basket of deplorables' who endorse 'racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic [and] Islamophobic' (Holan, 2016) sentiments? The group differences between Clinton, Trump and third party/undecided voters certainly paint a picture of separate groups of voters who can be identified by their shared beliefs on a wide variety of disparate attitudinal measures. Trump supporters in the current sample did, indeed, have the highest mean scores on all of the prejudices measured, including those identified by Clinton. Clinton supporters, in the current sample, were a striking opposite, with considerably lower mean scores on each of the attitudes measured, indicating a greater acceptance for a cross-section of diverse identities. Yet, despite the clear group differences that suggest support for the basket analogy, the correlation matrix still shows significantly stronger correlations between related prejudices (e.g., modern and old-fashioned homophobia) than between prejudices directed at separate groups (e.g., modern homonegativity and Islamophobia, $r = .37$). On the whole, however, each of the prejudices and worldviews measured in the current sample did correlate with each other, suggesting that Clinton's basket analogy was on the right track, whether politically savvy or not.

In terms of an underlying construct tying these prejudicial attitudes together, it would appear that SDO and RWA once again serve as strong proxies for identifying other types of prejudicial attitudes. In the current sample, correlations between SDO and the other measures of prejudice ranged from .32 to .58 with a mean coefficient of $r = .53$. RWA also had high correlations with many of the other prejudices measured, with coefficients ranging from .27 to .85 and a mean coefficient of $r = .68$. This concurs with past research that has made similar observations concerning the operation of SDO and RWA in predicting additional social prejudices (e.g. Whitley, 1999) and may suggest an area for future research with respect to prejudice interventions. While the correlational nature of this research cannot suggest an order of causation, it would be interesting to investigate interventions aimed at reducing SDO and RWA (Dhont, Van Hiel, & Hewstone, 2014; Ruthig, Kehn, Gamblin, Vanderzanden, & Jones, 2017; Shook, Hopkins, & Koech, 2016) in an attempt to reduce multiple forms of prejudice at once. One of the strengths of such an approach, if it were to prove successful, would be the ability to direct interventions at wide audiences without having to narrow in on any single type of prejudice.

Limitations

This study is not without limitations. Although it was strengthened by the time delay between the collection of attitude measures and voting intentions, the sample was one of convenience, not a

representative cross-section of eligible American voters, and the group sizes were unequal. Furthermore, participants self-selected into both sections of the survey, first by volunteering for a study on 'attitudes and opinions' and then later by agreeing to complete the brief follow-up questionnaire concerning their voting intentions. It is possible that individuals who agreed to the follow-up had different views on voting than those who did not agree to complete a brief survey about their voting intentions. This likely influenced the high rate of individuals reporting a strong intention of voting in the upcoming election, while reducing the number of intentional non-voters within the sample. Those who did participate in the study were predominantly White, heterosexual, male voters, with more than half residing in the state of Utah. Consequently, the associations between attitudes and voting intentions may be different for other segments of the American electorate. In particular, women's voting decisions may be influenced by their attitudes differently, particularly in this election where a great deal of media coverage focused on topics related to how the Republican nominee spoke about and treated women. Men with more minority identities may also have had different associations between their attitudes and voting intentions. However, given the overall prominence of heterosexual White men within the structure of American society, the current results do give us some indication of the associations between attitudes, ideological beliefs and voting intentions in the 2016 election and do so by relying on well-validated measures of attitudes. It is important to note that the study was not attempting to quantify the number of voters for each candidate, but rather the pattern of associations between voter attitudes and voter intentions – a factor that is less likely to be influenced by a lack of representativeness.

An additional limitation of the study was the lack of collecting information concerning participants' political ideologies or party membership. While measures associated with conservative ideology were included, these do not definitively tell us who may have been a Republican or Democrat voter. In the United States, where there is a two-party system, this factor may have been an important issue in dictating how individuals would vote. This may have been especially relevant for the 2016 election, when the Republican nominee (Trump) was strongly opposed by many Republicans, creating a difficult dilemma for Republican party members and voters: vote for the nominee that the Party does not fully support, vote against one's party or abstain from voting. For many, the choice of abstention may have felt less damning than voting for a Democrat, regardless of who the Democrats had nominated. Additional measures, or perhaps in-depth interviews, would be more telling in attempting to understand the specific rationales behind voting intentions in the current study, but these methods were beyond the scope of the follow-up questionnaire.

Conclusion

The difficult truth about prejudice of any kind is that no one is immune. It can be difficult to confront the reality of prejudice lurking behind what we believe to be well-reasoned beliefs and opinions, and yet, very rarely can anyone claim that none of their views are tainted by one form of prejudice or another. The original version of this paper was drafted shortly before the 2016 US presidential election. At the time, nearly every poll was predicting that not only would Clinton win, but that she would win by a significant margin. The original last sentence of the paper read as follows: 'the question facing American voters [now] is whether they would like to acknowledge the potential prejudices influencing their plans to vote *against* Hillary Clinton, before they vote, or sometime after President Trump's 2017 inauguration'. Given that it is now too late for the first option, the question remains as to whether American voters will acknowledge the role that prejudice, and especially sexism, played in contributing to Trump's victory and seek to remedy such prejudices within society. If they do not, the consequences will not 'just'[6] be a second Trump administration, but the very real likelihood of repeating history the next time a viable female presidential candidate is on the ballot.

Notes

1. In the US Election System, each party holds 'primaries', in which they elect the person who will receive the party's nomination. Part of these primaries includes debates between the candidates, and Megyn Kelly, a now former Fox News Anchor, was one of the moderators for one of the Republican Primary Debates.
2. The realm of Internet blogs and the people who read and write them (Dictionary.com, 2017).
3. As assessed by independent samples *t*-tests. All *p* values ranged between .42 and <.001, with the majority being <.001. There were no mean differences greater than a single scale point, with the majority being less than half a scale point. Full analyses are available from the author upon request.
4. The 10-item version was used over the original 12-item, due to reports of superior factorial structure with the 10-item version reported in Morrison et al. (2005).
5. ATLG was chosen over MHS due to the level of rhetoric on the election more closely approximating the construct of old-fashioned homophobia as opposed to modern homonegativity and Islamophobia was chosen over modern racism, again, because of the strong views concerning 'security' and heightened scrutiny of immigrants and travelers from Islamic nations during the election. Supplemental analyses were run with using alternate predictors (e.g. MHS instead of ATLG) and results were similar to those reported in the manuscript.
6. It is difficult to conceive of any aspect of a Trump presidency being inconsequential, given what has transpired in only the first 8 months of his term: multiple attempts at banning Muslims from specific countries from entering the country, firing of the director of the FBI, attempted repeals of the healthcare programme that provides healthcare insurance to millions of Americans who would otherwise be unable to have health insurance; a ban on transgender individuals in the military; increased hostilities and tensions between the United States and North Korea concerning the potential for nuclear war; repeal of the Dreamer's act, which provides protection from deportation for children brought to the USA illegally before their 16th birthday; and removal the USA from the Paris Climate Agreement.

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Notes on contributor

Karen L. Blair, PhD., is an Assistant Professor of Psychology at St. Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia, Canada, and director of KLB Research. Dr. Blair studies the role that social support for relationships plays in the development, maintenance and dissolution of relationships, LGBTQ Psychology, and the connections between relationships, social prejudices, and health. For more information, please visit: www.DrKarenBlair.com.

ORCID

Karen L. Blair http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8602-098X

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